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Despite the availability of his work being at the time limited to the sole publication of his doctoral 
theses, Simondon’s thought managed to achieve some noteworthy recognition among his 
contemporaries. One of the most evident manifestations of this appreciation is the review of L’individu 
et sa genese pshysico-biologique (Simondon 1964) that Gilles Deleuze wrote in 1966 (Deleuze 2004). 
In this essay, Deleuze expresses his appreciation for Simondon’s concept of individuation, defining it 
as a ‘respectable, even venerable notion’ (86). This concept rests on the idea that individual beings 
represent only the temporary effects of more fundamental processes of becoming. Rather than 
moving from already formed individuals, philosophical descriptions of the world must start by 
considering the complex series of processes behind the genesis and transformations of beings: that is, 
to think individuation before and beyond individuals. Consequently, when accounting for the 
transformations of individuals, this process must not be considered as the mere transition between 
stable states. For Simondon, in fact, the illusory fixedness of stable states approximates the more 
complex state of metastability. Metastability is the condition in which dynamical systems can be 
pushed beyond equilibrium by even minimal alterations in the play of forces they are subject to, and 
change, at times unpredictably and irreversibly.  
The notion of metastability shows already the importance, for Simondon, of considering 
processes of becoming in relation to their respective milieus. This connects to an attention to 
thresholds, biological membranes and topology, that Simondon shares with Deleuze, who highlights 
that ‘on this point Simondon has written an admirable chapter, “topology and ontogenesis”’ (88).  The 
connection between individuation and topology represents a crucial node of the intersection between 




The politics of hylomorphism 
 
Taken up also in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 39-74, 369), this critique targets a 
remnant of Aristotelian doctrine that depicts beings as the products of an imposition of pure forms on 
undifferentiated matter. The hylomorphic scheme reduces drastically the variety of factors 
determining ontogenesis and triggering transformations, wrongly attributing ontological primacy to 
form. Interestingly, Simondon believed hylomorphism to be more than a mere approximation of the 
processual character of reality, and to originate from forms of social inequality:  
 
What the hylomorphic schema reflects in the first place is a representation of work 
and an equally socialized representation of the individual living being... It is 
essentially the operation commanded by the free man and executed by the slave; 
the free man chooses the matter... The form corresponds to what [he] conceived... 
and that he must express positively when giving his orders... The distinction 
between form and matter, between soul and body, reflects a city that contains 
citizens in opposition to slaves (Simondon 2005: 51)  
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Sharing this idea, Deleuze and Guattari write that  
 
The ‘"hylomorphic" model [implies] both a form that organizes matter and a 
matter prepared for the form; it has often been shown that this schema derives 
less from technology or life than from a society divided into governors and 
governed, and later, intellectuals and manual laborers. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 
369) 
 
Brick production assumes a paradigmatic value in Simondon’s critique. In his example, the cast plays 
the role of the pure and active form imposed on the clay, which is merely regarded as a formless 
substance: ‘the free man chooses the matter, [that is] indeterminate since it is sufficient to designate 
it generically by the name of substance without seeing it, without manipulating it, without preparing 
it’ (Simondon 2005: 51). By modelling becoming on the practice of moulding, hylomorphism reflects 
the structures of power that justify the necessity for systems to be organised by transcendent factors. 
In order to impose themselves undisturbed, however, these forms of domination need diminishing 
systems’ potentiality for self-organisation and concealing the influence of the milieu on the operation. 
 
Simondon contrasts the primacy of form as ideal principle with a more concrete process of in-
formation: this essentially describes the emergence of form rather than its imposition, by outlining all 
the forces that contribute to the appearance of specific forms, their effects and their co-dependent 
variations. As a consequence, Simondon maintains that morphogenesis is better described in terms of 
modulation than of moulding. As he writes in his major thesis, in fact, for him ‘Individuation is a 
modulation’ (Simondon 2005: 219). In general terms, modulation can be defined as the continuous 
variation of a line of becoming that is not segmented by the hylomorphic dyad form-matter, but 
changes in response to both external and internal factors. According to the philosopher, ‘modulation 
is the transformation of energy into structure’ (431). Contrary to the hylomorphic perspective, then, 
matter is eminently active for Simondon, and must be conceived as the result of an interplay of forces 
that constitute emergent structures. The configuration of these interactions between forces 
characterises the tendencies and capacities of systems, and the milieus in which they unfold trigger, 
influence and contribute to regulate their transformations.  
Individuation is relational, individuals are neither static nor closed systems, and modulation is 
a non-periodic wave of becoming whose inflexions are determined by the impact of external forces 
and by the emergence of effects related to self-organisation. These elements act on the process of 
individuation, all contributing to determine its uninterrupted development.  
 
The age of control 
 
Informed by a profound knowledge of technical processes and aware of their relation to structures of 
power, Simondon’s work dispels the black box constituted by the ideal mould evoked by 
hylomorphism and articulates the notions of individuation and modulation in relation to topology. 
This conceptual node connects three points of interest for Deleuze, who contemplates these notions 
in Simondon’s work and put them to use in his own. As testified by the few explicit references 
scattered through his major works, in fact, Deleuze’s philosophy was significantly influenced by 
Simondon’s thought (Hui 2015). Because of this, the past years have seen the publication of a growing 
number of scholarly analyses of the effects, uses and transformations of Simondon’s central concepts 
in Deleuze’s corpus (Sauvagnargues 2016; Scott 2017).  
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Not proposing another map of these relations, but trying to sketch an additional zone of it, 
this essay attempts an application of Simondon’s concepts beyond their historical constraints: an 
experiment made possible precisely through their interaction with Deleuze’s philosophy. Indeed, as 
highlighted by Alberto Toscano, the significance of Simondon’s philosophy for Deleuze can be either 
used to retrace the evolution of his thought, or to connect the two ‘in the delineation of a problem 
that exceeds them both’ (Toscano 2009: 381). The problem we would like to outline and connect to 
this intersection between the works of Simondon and Deleuze regards the use of digital machines as 
technologies of power and its effects on society. Especially since the configuration and use of privately-
owned computational technologies has recently revealed how much they can influence political 
scenarios (Cadwalladr 2017), the speed and modality of the changes digital technologies are provoking 
to our lives call in fact for an urgent reflection. Despite both philosophers did not have the chance to 
confront with the actual situation, Deleuze’s Postscript on control societies (Deleuze 1995) expresses 
its late concerns for this issue, containing at the same time a series of thought-provoking references 
to Simondon’s work.  
Deleuze’s text revolves around the transition he diagnoses between societies characterised 
by the diffusion of Foucauldian discipline, made to correspond to the age of industrial machines, and 
an era of control, a new model of domination made available by digital technologies. Deleuze claims 
that this new age is not characterised by an hylomorphic form of power, but by a constant modulation: 
‘controls are modulations’ he writes, clearly adopting Simondon’s concept (178). The philosopher 
maintains that modulation operates ‘like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one 
moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another’ (179). This definition 
characterises control as the continuous adjustment of power in relation to the variations of the matter 
on which it is exerted. Employing the opposition between moulding and modulation proposed by 
Simondon,  Deleuze’s essay translates it on a political plane, mapping two types of technologies of 
domination: Foucauldian discipline as the hylomorphic imposition of order on the body, and control, 
as a modulation of the human, no longer conceived as merely passive receptacle of fixed forms. 
 
Control develops as the result of a series of conjoined transformations: the first consists in the fact 
that capitalism, from its industrial form, starts to transition towards the paradigms of service 
economy. Deleuze writes that digital capitalism, ‘no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells 
finished products…What it seeks to sell is services’ (181). A second transformation, triggered by the 
first, relates to the difference between tools and instruments Simondon hints at in his work on the 
technical object. There, we read that  
 
by tool one understands the technical object enabling one to prolong and arm the 
body in order to accomplish a gesture, and by instrument the technical object that 
enables one to prolong and adapt the body in order to achieve better perception; 
the instrument is a tool of perception. (Simondon 2016: 130) 
 
If we think of industrial machines as automated tools, digital technologies can be considered as 
automated instruments. From a certain point of view, these are machines that broaden the capacity 
of cognition, enabling their users to relate to distant objects by bringing them closer via the 
cyberspace. If the first type of machine was meant to automate and reproduce gestures, digital 
instruments, in their most diffused and accessible form, are meant to suggest cognitive connections.  
The third transformation consists in a change of milieu: if industrial machines have segmented 
individuation in a form of disciplinary hylomorphism, this is because of the specific milieus they shape. 
As a site of enclosure, in fact, the factory is built around the mechanism of industrial production and 
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the school, around analogue or live teaching techniques. The digital entails instead a new type of space 
in which one produces and re-produces contents and studies on MOOCs.  
What changes between the industrial and computational ages is the milieu that the 
correspondent machines generate for the worker or the user. In the first case, these environments 
can be classified as Euclidean. These are spaces subject to a transcendent source of order like the 
Cartesian axes, which overdetermine an unformed space in order to organise it. Foucault has 
notoriously seen factories, barracks and prisons as such kinds of spaces, the configuration of which is 
functional to an imposition of order “from above”: ‘It was a question of distributing individuals in a 
space in which one might isolate them and map them... It was a question of organizing the multiple, 
of providing oneself with an instrument to cover it and to master it; it was a question of imposing upon 
it an “order”’ (Foucault 1995: 144, 148). Disciplines maximise efficiency and prevent strikes, riots and 
freedom of movement, concealing the self-organising power of the elements they organise. As we will 
show in the next pages, computational machines connected to the web generate instead a non-
Euclidean or topological milieu, a space whose configuration is not prepared by the imposition of 
hylomorphic forms of organisation.  
Simondon clearly understood the milieu to be in process as well, but the operation through 
which the cyberspace relates to processes of individuation seems to us to respond to different rules 
than in analogue environments. Following Deleuze’s warning regarding the adoption of the digital as 
a technology of power, we should ask how, in their present state, processes of psychic and collective 
individuation are filtered and modified by the digital. This task necessitates careful consideration of 
new individuations taking place through and within digital milieus. 
The last transformation highlighted in the Postscript is precisely related to individuation.  
Showing his concerns in relation to the processes taking place in the digital age, Deleuze notes quite 
cryptically that, in the age of control, ‘individuals become “dividuals”, and masses become samples, 
data, markets, or “banks”’ (Deleuze 1995: 180). Unfortunately, he did not expand on the notion of 
dividual, that nevertheless points at a new phase of individuation engendered by the diffusion of 
computational technologies: the individuation of a digital entity that is taking place in the new milieu 
fashioned by the computational. This process begins with the extraction of data points from the 
activity of individual users, that are made to correspond to personal features and converge in the 
process of individuation of a digital entity. Despite not corresponding to individual users, this entity 
influences their processes of individuations: the individuation of the dividual constitutes in fact a 
means for the modulatory control of the user. Users individuate by interacting through and with a 
digital milieu, their actions online feed the individuation of the dividual, and this process constitutes 
the basis on which the digital milieu through which users individuate gets modified by suggestion 
algorithms, influencing in turn their individuation. 
 
With this essay, we will attempt a description of this process: an account that will be based on one 
side on Simondon’s philosophy of individuation and, on the other, benefit from Deleuze’s ideas with 
regard to topology, which allow to understand certain political phenomena related to the 
transformation of space. Indeed, if Simondon’s philosophy allowed Deleuze to define the passage 
between a hylomorphic mode of power and an informational one as the overwriting of digital 
modulation on top of disciplinary moulding (Deleuze 1995), the description of these forms of 
domination cannot neglect the relation between topology and individuation (Simondon 2005: 148-
156; 223-228) and how digital technologies alter this relation.   
In the next pages, we will therefore attempt to project a line of interaction between Deleuze 
and Simondon, and articulate the notion of individuation, the importance of the milieu and its 
topology for this process, and the mechanism of modulation. In accord with Simondon’s idea that a 
description of individuation must consider the milieu in which the process takes place, the first part 
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of this essay will expose Deleuze’s insights in matters of non-Euclidean spaces (Deleuze & Guattari 
1987: 474-500) and consider the character of the web as a new theatre of individuation. The second 
part instead will briefly consider the technical lineage that has prepared the individuation of the 
dividual in its key features. After, we will focus on the process of individuation of Deleuze’s dividual, 
whose characteristics will be showed to be analogous to those Simondon attributed to the processes 
of living individuation. It is indeed precisely by virtue of its hybrid character that the individuation of 
the dividual has been weaponized as a technology of power to perform the control Deleuze was 
warning about in the Postscript: as a digital individuation that works as a living one, the individuation 
of the dividual allows a virtually limitless modulation of the user through microtargeting techniques. 
In the last section, we will then show how the dividual can accept information an indefinite 
amount of times, as in the case of vital individuations (Deleuze 2004: 88), even if it constitutes as the 
coagulation of data around a digital germ, as in the case of physical individuations (Simondon 2006: 
32-33, 75, 78-79). We will highlight that, precisely because of this hybrid trait, the dividual allows for 
the incessant modulation of the user. 
 
Addressing the topic of the individuation of the dividual amounts at describing the keystone on which 
our interaction with and through digital platforms are designed, and the fulcrum around which psychic 
and collective processes of individuation take place in the context of computational capitalism. In our 
conclusion we will propose that the digital represents an effective means of domination precisely 
because it operates through a particular type of milieu, a digital environment that allows the 
individuation of the dividual to take place as a technical process of hybrid individuation: a process that 
replicates a living individuation in silico, adding the flexibility of living individuations to a digital tool. 
 
 
Riemannian cyberspace: a new regime of individuation 
 
As mentioned above, Simondon describes becoming through the notion of individuation. The 
condition of possibility for this process is the relation of a line of individuation with the milieu in which 
it develops: ‘the principle of individuation, in the strict sense of the term, is the complete system in 
which the genesis of the individual takes place’ (Simondon 2005: 63). This is a fundamental 
prerequisite for Simondon’s critique of the hylomorphic model and underlies the idea that the seat of 
individuation is always open, namely that the processes of individuation are incessantly fuelled and 
influenced by the forces that compose the milieu: ‘what individuation makes appear is not only the 
individual but the individual-milieu couple’ (25). The set of relations between what is individuating 
and its associated milieu has a series of possible configurations, that characterise what Simondon calls 
regimes of individuation. These regimes are constituted by the arrangement of the relations 
characterising different domains of reality and determining the relative processes of individuation: 
‘Instead of presupposing [the existence of] substances in order to account for individuation, we take 
the different regimes of individuation as the basis for domains such as matter, life, spirit, society’ (32).  
As different social and technical environments generate the condition for as many regimes of 
individuation, it appears every day more clear that the digital is producing an entirely new regime. 
Circulating in a cyberspace now almost ubiquitous, the contemporary user is individuated by the 
digital machinery of platform capitalism. This individuation can be modelled adopting Simondon’s 
methodology: ‘The method used doesn't consist in assuming from the beginning the realized 
individual that is in need of explaining, but to take the complete reality that precedes individuation.’ 
(64). This means that, in order to understand our condition in the eyes of the machine, and how its 
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vision changes what we are, it’s important to consider the nature of the milieu through (and in) which 
a new type of individuation takes place. 
Humans have always produced objects in which they could circulate, from dwellings and cities, 
to big machines like ocean liners’ engines, and Foucault’s work on sites of confinement has shown 
that the organisation of space structuring functional environments is crucial in the constitution of 
relation of power. In a recently published article titled L’Homme et l’objet, Simondon defines these 
kinds of objects as ‘enveloping’. The peculiarity of these structures is precisely that their configuration 
alters the internal relations of the set of objects that contain:  
 
For example, in teaching, the discussion around a table does not create the same 
relations as those of a classroom for thirty [students] or an amphitheatre. 
Discussing around a table "democratizes" the relations. The classroom… used for a 
course, leaves a lot of room... to the teacher and allows him to be autocratic. The 
amphitheatre, with its amplification equipment, immobilizes the teacher but gives 
a certain freedom to the students. (Simondon 2018: 22)  
 
In this passage, Simondon is essentially describing the circulation of individuals and 
information in relation to freedom and authority, stressing that power relations change according to 
the structure of the enveloping object in which they develop. The digital produces a new, peculiar type 
of enveloping object. In this environment, the circulation of individuals and of information assumes a 
different character than the ones we are accustomed to. This difference is not limited to the 
distribution of what crosses or navigates the space, but consists principally in how this milieu connects 
what it envelops. This is because the movements taking place in such digital enveloping object cross a 
radically different type of space: the cyberspace is not a Euclidean space, but a topological one, i.e. 
‘Riemannian’ or ‘smooth’. Deleuze and Guattari define this type of space as ‘An amorphous collection 
of juxtaposed pieces that can be joined together in an infinite number of ways: we see that patchwork 
is literally a Riemannian space, or vice versa’. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 476) 
 
The process of space-smoothening that culminates in the digital finds its antecedents in the proto-
montage of double exposure made possible by early chronophotographic studies, and its pictorial 
counterpart in the cubist experiments with the combination of visually distorted and temporally 
diachronic chunks of space. Cinema subsequently developed this process more fully in the different 
declinations of film editing techniques. In this context, in fact, if the “sub-medium space” of a 
sequence shot can be said to be Euclidean, the one of a montage following cross-frame movements is 
Riemannian, a space of connection or patchwork space (476). The essentially technical process of 
Riemannianisation of space doesn’t stop at the structuring of visual spaces, but shapes the navigable 
space of the web, in which hyperlinks allow the seamless recombination of synchronic but non-
contiguous chunks of space and the speed of communication erases almost entirely the delays in 
transmission related to distance. This operation structures a new paradigm of circulation that entails 
the emergence of an equally novel regime of individuation. 
The difference between analogue and digital enveloping objects, and between Euclidean and 
topological spaces is not just relative to different systems of representation of space, but tied to what 
one could do with them, and maybe more significantly in them. On this note, what is important in the 
discussion of smoothness and striation is not only their difference, but their reciprocal convertibility. 
Deleuze and Guattari stress that their conversions are not symmetrical: ‘How does smooth space 
become striated? How does striated space become smooth? These are not symmetrical operations 
and their mixtures and tendencies produce different kinds of assemblages’ (Adkins 2015: 231). The 
cyberspace is the fruit of what Deleuze and Guattari define as a ‘retroactive smoothening’ (Deleuze & 
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Guattari 1987: 481, 482), a smoothening of an already heavily striated space, namely the scientifically 
and socially metricized, subdivided, organised and oriented space in which we have always exclusively 
circulated. This conception has been perfectly grasped by Sasso and Villani, in their definition of the 
concept of smooth space: 
 
The concept of smooth space represents a particularly fruitful model for thinking 
of different contemporary phenomena characterized by a valorisation of the 
dissolution of borders and structures, [as] of fluidity, [of the] unplanned and [of 
the] spontaneous. In this sense, it is an excellent tool for conceptualizing the 
cyberspace. Indeed, does not the Internet function precisely as an adirectional 
space, unpolarized and non-mappable, where images are tied and untied on plane 
of equal proximity? (Sasso & Villani 2003: 134-135) 
 
From this perspective then, the digital constitutes a Riemannian or smooth space. If the infosphere 
has achieved its smoothening with the development of the world wide web, soon after, it has however 
been transformed in a new territory to dominate. In their study of these kinds of spaces, Deleuze and 
Guattari already noticed this possibility: ‘The sea, then the air and the stratosphere, become smooth 
spaces again, but, in the strangest of reversals, it is for the purpose of controlling striated space more 
completely’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 480). Originally spread as an instrument of freedom, this space 
has soon revealed its potential for control and has then been striated again, co-opted by capital and 
transformed into a new, incredibly effective means for domination. As Deleuze and Guattari highlight, 
‘the smooth itself can be drawn and occupied by diabolical powers of organization’ (480). 
Platforms, in this perspective, are striation styles or motives, whilst search engines hold the 
power of imposing a directionality over the smooth dimensionality of a space not yet captured, 
showing what “exists” and what it is of importance. This new striation differs from the analogue one 
because it is subordinated to movement and identification, instead of being dependent on the 
imposition of restrictions and the standardisation of movements. Its paradigm is not to confine 
individuals in specific places and to determine their movements through disciplines, but to allow them 
a certain margin of freedom, and to constantly tailor their domination on the basis of their behaviours. 
 
The character of this space defines then the technology of power that emerges from and is applied to 
it: control. As Deleuze and Guattari claim in A Thousand Plateaus, ‘The smooth is the continuous 
variation, continuous development of form’ (478). Echoing Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism, 
control is described as continuous modulation, as the constant variation ‘forming a system of varying 
geometry’ (Deleuze 1995: 178). In the smooth cyberspace, discipline yields to control. The latter 
defines and is grafted upon a new regime of individuation, that operates through ‘a modulation, like 
a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose 
mesh varies from one point to another’ (179). This shift in techniques of domination mirrors 
Simondon’s critique of the hylomorphic model, which is based on the imposition of an order (“Make 
me a brick!”), and now substituted by a process of modulation. 
As a theatre of continuous variation, the implementation of cyberspace as a tool for 
domination is connected to a mutation in capitalism, a transformation already detectable in the 1970s:  
 
It is as though, at the outcome of the striation that capitalism was able to carry to 
an unequaled point of perfection, circulating capital necessarily recreated, 
reconstituted, a sort of smooth space in which the destiny of human beings is 
recast… a new smooth space is produced in which capital reaches its "absolute" 
speed, based on machinic components rather than the human component of labor. 
The multinationals fabricate a kind of deterritorialized smooth space in which 
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points of occupation as well as poles of exchange become quite independent of 
the classical paths to striation. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 492)  
 
Digital capitalism employs the potential for control of this type of milieu, deploying a new modulatory 
strategy, so that ‘Nowadays, exploitation is exercised on the process of individuation rather than on 
individual entities’ (Leonardi 2010), via profiling and microtargeting. 
 
Simondon didn’t have much to say about this type of space or the form of control it enables. However, 
he believed in a deeper form of alienation than the one described by Marx: one related to the 
exclusion of technics from culture. To help reducing this “technological alienation”, Simondon writes 
in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, one must undertake ‘a study of the genesis of the 
technical object’ (Simondon 2016: xiii). The next section will attempt such task in relation to the 
dividual, that we consider as the central tool of control. 
 
 
The dividual’s technical lineage 
 
Simondon’s philosophy will help us understand what happens in this space. Not going so far as to 
consider patchwork spaces, Simondon acknowledges in fact both the importance of the milieu’s 
topological configuration for individuation and the correspondence between this feature of the 
system and the character of what is individuating: 
 
The preindividual is the source of chronological and topological dimensionality ... 
Moreover, it is this assumption of the preindividual character of the first reality 
that makes it possible to consider the physical individual as being in fact a whole; 
The individual corresponds to a certain dimensionality of the real, that is, to an 
associated topology and chronology. (Simondon 2005: 149-150) 
 
Very interestingly, the philosopher notices also that willingly altering the topology of an environment 
through technology can produce different effects: ‘it is by modifying the topological conditions that 
nuclear energy can be used either for sudden effects... or for moderate continuous effects... 
consequently, one can say that the degree of individuation of an ensemble depends on the correlation 
between chronology and topology of the system’ (150). In Simondon’s view then, the 
complementarity between the individual as an act and its associated milieu (63-64) is such that the 
milieu alters individuation just as much as individuals can modify their milieus.  
 
As anticipated, in producing a new, topological space, digital technologies entail new types of 
individuation. On one side, people individuate through the digital, as through a tool or a technique 
like writing, but on the other hand, something else is undergoing a process of individuation taking 
place in the digital: the monstrous figure of Deleuze’s dividual. The rise of digital enveloping objects 
and the diffusion of a new paradigm of circulation entail not only a new scenario for the individuation 
of people, but also the individuation of a new type of entity, that is complementary to this kind of 
space. The imperative of our age is to understand what happens to individuation in the context of 
cyber capitalism, when this process is mediated through a digital milieu, the individuals become 
dividuals and this very dynamic is exploited as a ground for control. This shift is provoked by a specific 
technology, and focussing on its origin and development will help us understand how the digital 
produces the dividual, and how this is used as an instrument of control. 
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To understand this technology of power, the character and function of the dividuals that populate the 
cyberspace, we must consider the character of the first cybernetic problem. During the Second World 
War, Norbert Wiener worked on the technology of anti-aircraft missiles, and specifically on the 
development of a device for the automatic monitoring and prediction of aircrafts’ positions that would 
have facilitated their engagement. Because of this, the origin of cybernetics is in some way related to 
an epistemological impasse that Florian Sprenger has defined as the ‘challenge of relativity’ (Sprenger, 
2018). With this formula, Sprenger defines ‘The operational and epistemic impossibility of… 
simultaneously determining both of these variables— location and motion— in a single act of 
observation’ (2). Echoing the uncertainty principle articulated by Heisenberg before the war, the 
challenge Wiener faced has given birth to a technical lineage (Simondon 2012: 49-60) of machines 
whose fundamental aim is to solve this problem. As highlighted by Sprenger,  
 
Such solutions include the use of feedback loops to extrapolate the future locations 
of objects, the invention of objects that can independently correct their path by 
registering their own movement, and finally the self-registration of movement – in 
other words: from the anti-aircraft predictor over cruise missiles that update their 
target during flight to drones whose movements can be tracked and operated from 
a distance. (Sprenger 2018: 3) 
 
The elementary tactic to solve or at least circumvent the problem consists in the prediction of 
positions based on the analysis of tendencies, and the use of these predictions to direct future actions.  
This lineage started by machines like Wiener’s “predictor” has immensely benefited from the diffusion 
of the central element of the digital revolution: mobile internet access. The essential precondition of 
mobile technologies is their constant connection to networks modelled on the GSM and the LTE 
standards, whose coverage is distributed by radio towers with different frequencies and limited 
radiuses. When in movement, portable devices often cross the boundaries between these areas. Such 
passage between different ‘cells’ would cause a loss of connection if the devices themselves didn’t 
produce data that let them be identified and allowed on the network. For this reason, the technical 
prerequisite of being connected in mobility is for every device to hold a series of addresses (Sprenger, 
2018: 7). With the diffusion of complex systems of profiling and suggestion algorithms, the importance 
of these addresses becomes crucial: it is in fact because of this precondition to their functioning that 
digital networks reveal themselves as efficient means of control. 
 
The almost ubiquitous superposition of the smooth cyberspace on the analogue one is due to the 
technology of mobile networks, which allows constant connection to portable devices. If on one hand 
then ‘it is characteristic for mobile devices (respectively, their users) that they can move (almost) 
everywhere without losing connectivity’ (3), on the other hand, these devices have to self-register on 
the network to stay connected. ‘In this sense, such technologies react to the same challenge as missiles 
or drones and can be described as a part of a new solution: technologies of automatic self-registration’ 
(3). It is on the basis of these addresses that users are always monitored and their movements are 
constantly tracked, so that the paradigm of our age becomes to follow rather than to enclose. Allowing 
free circulation, digital control exploits freedom: ‘… now freedom itself, which is supposed to be the 
opposite of constraint, is producing coercion’ (Han, 2017: 2). In this scenario, as put by Savat, ‘‘‘control’ 
comes to be so subtle that it may well present itself in the form of “choice”’ (Savat 2009: 57). Because 
of portability, the digital enveloping object is massive and omnipresent, superimposed to the analogue 
milieu. In this regard, Savat is right in saying that the sense of dividuality relates to the fact that 
disciplinary societies and control societies coexist, so that we have two identities, we are doubly 
trapped (58-59). But this is only part of the picture, what we perceive with our own eyes. What is 
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perceived by the eyes of the machine is another sense of the notion of dividual, that can be 
understood by looking at its own process of individuation, triggered precisely by these addresses. 
 
 
The germ and the cluster 
 
The importance of addresses appears clear when we look at the mechanism Simondon envisaged for 
the process of individuation. The individuation of the dividual, in fact, follows the general mechanism 
of transduction, that is the operation structuring individuation in all the domains.  
Simondon defines transduction as: 
 
a physical, biological, mental, social operation by which an activity propagates little 
by little within a domain, basing this propagation on a structuration of the domain 
operated from one place to the next: each region of constituted structure serves 
to the next region as a principle of constitution, so that a modification extends 
progressively at the same time as this structuring operation. (Simondon 2005: 32) 
 
What the character of the cyberspace changes in the model of transduction described by Simondon is 
that the propagation of a digital individuation like the one of the dividual follows the line of circulation 
constituting the patchwork of navigation. In other terms, it structures the milieu by connecting non-
contiguous chunks of space. This characterizes the first aspect of the dividual: because ‘space and that 
which occupies space tend to become identified, to have the same power’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 
488), the dividual is a patchwork itself, a cluster of interactions in non-contiguous portions of the 
cyberspace. 
 
Considering the individuation of the crystal, Simondon points out that the process is triggered by the 
accidental appearance of a germ. This is a catalytic structure, a quantum of information, a singularity 
that provokes the rupture of the pre-individual field’s metastable equilibrium and the beginning of 
the process of crystallisation. The individuation of the dividual can be said to be triggered by a germ 
as well. This can be an IP address, the IMEI code of a phone or both at the same time, acting as a 
catalytic piece of information that opens a space of aggregation for an automatically generated cluster 
of “personal” data. The dividual catalyses a multiplicity constituted by a coagulation of data and 
enriched by every activity online related to a piece of information. These catalysers, originally 
developed as identification tags necessary to guarantee constant connection to mobile devices, are 
then used for control, often delivered as “personalisation”, and are discriminated with regard to the 
accessibility to other sets information or “real-life services”, and employed to propose suggestions, be 
them of political or commercial nature. 
According to Simondon, the germ appears in a pre-individual milieu that is rich in potential. 
When the germ appears, a tension in the problematic field between ‘two twin sets not totally 
superimposable’ (Simondon 2005: 203) starts to be resolved. Indeed, in the words of Deleuze, 
individuation establishes communication between ‘disparates’, between ‘at least two orders of 
magnitude or two scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed’, two 
heterogeneous levels (Deleuze 1994: 246): in our case, analogue gestures and digital operations.  
These dimensions, the digital and the analogue, are separated and put into communication by a 
membrane. As rightly highlighted by Anne Sauvagnargues, the notion of membrane plays a significant 
role in Simondon’s account of the individuation of the living, according to a model in which ‘interiority 
and exteriority are not absolute but metastable, relative to each other, and their interfacing surface 
is itself in becoming, in relation’ (Sauvagnargues 2012: 67). In the case of the digital enveloping object, 
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this surface can be found at the level of the interface, that is the first membrane in the play of 
‘trandsuctive mediation[s] of interiorities and exteriorities’ that feeds the digital (Simondon 2005: 
225). Like in the case of living beings then, in which multiple ‘stages of interiority and exteriority’ (224) 
are separated by the structures of organisms, the interactive image displayed on a screen is just one 
of the many thresholds through which transduction moves in the digital enveloping object: the 
thresholds between different levels of machine language, hardware and software states, but also 
between single machines and servers have in fact to be taken into account to give a full image of the 
individuation of a dividual.  
The cross-dimensional transduction analogue-digital changes then both the milieus through a 
logic according to which each action provides the starting point for more precise profiles, and more 
appropriate suggestions.  
  
As a technical object, the dividual enjoys a great “margin of indeterminacy”. Simondon defines this 
notion as what ‘allows the machine to be sensitive to outside information’ (2017: 17), a characteristic 
of environmental sensitivity that, according to the philosopher, marks its real degree of perfection.  
 As put by Hui in his analysis of the use of this concept in Du mode then, ‘the margin of indeterminacy 
supposes... that the machines have flexible schemes, which allow them to become "sensitive"’ (Hui 
2016). Here, the term ‘sensitive’, reveals a link to the perceptive, and therefore organic dimension. 
The changeability of the dividual differentiates significantly control from other technologies of power 
and reveals the individuation of the dividual to be interestingly close to the one Simondon ascribed to 
living beings: 
 
there is physical individuation when the system is capable to receive information 
only once, then individuates by developing and amplifying this initial singularity in 
a non-self-limiting manner. If the system is able to successively receive several 
inputs of information, to compatibilize several singularities instead of iterating the 
unique and initial singularity by cumulative effect and by transductive 
amplification, the individuation is of vital type... (Simondon 2005: 152) 
 
Highlighted also by Deleuze in his review of L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique (Deleuze 2004: 
88), this distinction is problematic, because it relates to Simondon’s conception of automation, which 
precedes the diffusion of advanced computational systems: 
 
According to Simondon, automation is first of all a phenomenon of the second 
industrial revolution: it is the image of the automaton that repeats indefinitely the 
same operation in the factory... Here, Simondon proposes a restrictive vision of the 
automatism that undoubtedly doesn't correspond to what cybernetics, but also 
our time, mean by that. (Hui 2016) 
 
Simondon didn’t envision the power of variation of the digital, and his definition of the difference 
between automata and organisms stems from that standpoint. With digital technologies of control 
like the dividual, the cybernetic mission of steering human beings like machines while modelling 
machines on the characteristics of living beings seems to get closer to its accomplishment. Today, 
automata are no longer limited to the mere repetition of a single function, and the algorithms 
capturing interactions and aggregating data from non-contiguous sites and interactions allow the 
dividual to automatically update itself and cover or discover areas of interest that can be the object 
of new predictions.  
It is through the harnessing of the indefinitely updatable process of individuation of the 
dividual, and because of its vast margin of indetermination as machine for the automatic coagulation 
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of data, that the modulation of control takes place. Instrument for the capture and capitalisation of 
the future, the individuation of the dividual approaches that of the living, and through this closeness 
exerts an unprecedented power on the human. The individuation of the dividual is a hybrid one, half 
inanimate and half alive, whose character echoes Deleuze’s definition of control as a new monster 
(Deleuze 1995: 178).  
 
The smooth cyberspace produces a new ‘modality of the relation between man and the machine’ 
(Simondon 2016: xiii). If the industrial age reduced the role of the human to the one of a servant of 
the machine meant to monitor its functioning, now that this machine has become an environment, a 
cyber-space, it blends with the background of life, it becomes invisible to the user, that doesn’t even 
monitor it anymore. As the relation of ‘who serves who’ became inverted (Chabot 2014: 39) in the 
passage from the tool to the technical individual, the digital inverts the relation between who 
monitors and who’s monitored. The new configuration of this relation is precisely what the machine 
of control mostly benefits from: a more profound form of alienation reinforced by the invisibility of 
the machine attached to the human and by the blackboxing of its mechanisms. Thanks to their 
character, these allow a certain degree of freedom to the controlled, whose domination is not 
perceived as constrictive. Deleuze’s warning on the advent of societies of control calls for an update 
of Simondon’s mechanology and the consideration of the new regimes of individuation produced by 
the digital. Following the line of interaction that we have drawn between the two philosophers, we 
are able to bring forward Simondon’s work through Deleuze’s description of smooth spaces. This 
allows to sketch how digital technologies of power exploit the very mechanism of individuation to 
covertly steer the lives of the users, encouraging an online freedom of interaction that is then 
exploited to inform control.  
It is on the basis of this diagram that, maybe, the alienation produced by being used and 
monitored by the machine of control can start to be fought. Suggestion algorithms deprive us of the 
freedom to individuate through the digital. The fight for the control of our own collective futures has 
then to be moved to a new battlefield expanding among and above analogue boundaries and 
threatening to swallow us all, indistinctly: ‘This is the enveloping or enveloped character of smooth 
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